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Abstract—Unprecedented growth of online social networks
(OSNs) increasingly makes privacy advocates and government
agencies worrisome alike. In this paper, we propose My3,
a privacy-friendly decentralized alternative for online social
networking. The My3 system exploits well-known interesting
properties of the current online social networks in its novel
design namely, locality of access, predictable access times,
geolocalization of friends, unique access requirements of the
social content, and implicit trust among friends. It allows users
to exercise ﬁner granular access control on the content, thus
making My3 extremely privacy-preserving. Moreover, we propose
different replication strategies that users may independently
choose for meeting their personalized performance objectives.
A detailed performance study evaluates the system regarding
proﬁle availability, access delay, freshness and storage load. By
using real-world data traces, we prove that My3 offers high
availability even with low average online time of users in the
network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Online social network paradigm has taken the Web 2.0
into unprecedented scales by offering innovative tools for
networking among users and distributing the user-generated
content. The conventional social networks (e.g. Facebook.com,
Google Plus) have recently seen an explosive growth. Face-
book has currently nearly 900 million users active on the
service at least once in a month. As a result, these OSNs
have become store houses of unprecedented amount of data in
the form of messages, photos, links, and personal information.
Online social network portals continue to evolve towards one-
stop hubs for content in a way that inﬂuences the future
of the Internet [1]. However, social networking portals that
are operated in a cloud infrastructure maintained by a single
authority (e.g., Facebook or Google) will strategically have
greater stakes in protecting the interests of the advertisers
than addressing the privacy requirements of the users. During
sign-up time, users consciously or unconsciously permit the
organizations to share their personal information with third-
parties in whatever form the organizations choose to [2]. In
addition, the leakage of personal information from OSNs can
be associated with the user activity on non-OSN sites as
well [3]. Moreover, as social information owned by a single
authority grows, so does its ﬁnancial power. Even if we trust
that the provider is motivated to protect user data, large-scale
data breaches are still possible as reported recently. In order to
address privacy concerns of OSN users, research community
has resorted to the decentralized (often P2P-based) paradigm
for OSN content management. Replacing the big-brother with
a community of users, enables OSN users to have more control
on their proﬁle content.
In this paper, we present My3, a decentralized online social
network that operates based on the resources contributed by
its users. We brieﬂy outline the system architecture originally
described in [4] and mainly focus on the distributed storage
layer. Speciﬁcally, we propose a number of proﬁle replication
algorithms that can be independently employed by users to
meet different performance objectives of their choice, namely
high proﬁle availability, high data freshness (i.e., low delay
for data consistency), low access delay, low storage overhead
or a certain combination of them. The design of the My3
system exploits several properties of the conventional online
social networks: (1) a user’s friends are clustered in a few
geographical locations and almost all the content accesses are
initiated from these locations (2) access patterns and times of
content accesses can be approximated with high precision to
a large extent. By employing real data traces from Facebook
and Twitter, we experimentally prove the effectiveness of our
replication algorithms towards their respective goals when
jointly or independently chosen by users. According to our
results, a total -not necessarily continuous- online time of 40
minutes by a user, is enough for achieving availability higher
than 90% with 4-5 proﬁle replicas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we discuss the background behind the My3 system
design. The storage layer is discussed in Section III, followed
by replication algorithms. In Section VI, we evaluate the
performance of the My3 design w.r.t. several criteria. In
Section VII, we discuss the related work and, ﬁnally in Section
VIII, we conclude and outline our future work.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we explain the properties of the conventional
social networks that drive the design of My3 and its replica
selection algorithms.
We observe that every user in an OSN has friends scattered
over a limited set of geographical locations (e.g. his home
town, working location, home country, location of previous
institute etc.) as shown in Fig. 1. This fact can be exploited
to choose replicas located in one or more of these locations
so that content stays in the proximity of the friends.
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Fig. 1: Geo-clustering of a user’s friends in Facebook.
Moreover, users in an online social network exhibit certain
online time patterns [5], [6] which can be exploited in choosing
the replication points so that replicas’ online time patterns
overlap with that of friends of a user. Note that, in a typical
OSN, most of the user’s proﬁle content is accessible only to his
friends, unlike typical web content which is world-accessible.
The My3 system exploits the trust relationships among friends
to improve the availability. We assume that a user of My3 runs
the client on his ofﬁce or personal laptop/computer. Hence, we
use the terms user and node interchangeably.
We consider optimizing at a single user level in all our
algorithms and not system-level optimization, as each user
runs these algorithms independently from others in a dis-
tributed setting. My3 allows users to personalize their proﬁle
conﬁguration in several dimensions such as availability, re-
sponsiveness, privacy risk, etc. We believe that a single global
conﬁguration policy for all the users in the system offered by
typical conventional social networks like Facebook, deprive
the users their autonomy on their own data.
A user u’s proﬁle content is hosted only on a set of self-
chosen trusted nodes, which enforce access control on the
content on behalf of the user. This set of trusted nodes for
a user is referred to as his trusted proxy set (TPS). The
TPS members for a user are selected so as to fulﬁll certain
performance goals.
III. STORAGE LAYER
In this section, we discuss the storage mechanism of the
My3 system which is an enhancement from [4], and mainly
address the construction of the set TPS(u) for a user u
from his social graph. For completeness, we revisit brieﬂy
the storage mechanism presented in [4].
The social network graph is denoted as G(U,R), where U
is the set of users represented by the vertices in the graph and
R is the set of friendship relations represented by edges. For
example, an edge between two vertices u1 and u2 models the
fact that users u1, u2 are friends. We assume that friendship
relationships are symmetric. This is the default assumption in
current OSN applications, e.g. Orkut, Facebook. We use the
notation NG(u) to represent the set of neighbors (i.e. friends
on the OSN) of user u in the social graph G, and NG[u] to
represent NG(u) ∪ {u}.
We assume that each user u in the social network is
characterized with two parameters: his geographical location
and online time period. For instance, the location can be set to
the country/city where the user is currently located. We exploit
location information of friends of a user, in order to place data
as close as possible to the nodes that most frequently access
the data for getting proﬁle updates etc.
This is quantiﬁed by the metric access cost Cu2u1 between
two geographical locations/users/nodes u1 and u2, which is
deﬁned as the IP latency between those two locations, for
example, a measured in [7].
Online time period represents the usual time that the user
is online in the social network. This is a continuous/discrete
time period, with a predeﬁned granularity (e.g., minutes,
hours), during which the user is active on the network and
contributes bandwidth, storage, etc. through his OSN client.
This parameter can be either a user input to the client or
approximated by the client from the user’s online history (for
example, as done in the later part of the paper). Beyond
this time window frame, the user is ofﬂine. We denote the
location and online time period parameters for a user u as Lu
and OTu respectively. Given two users u1 and u2’s locations
and online time settings, we argue that they can contact each
other and thus exchange data if and only if their online time
intervals overlap, which we represent by the condition that
OTu1 ∩OTu2 = ∅.
A. Trusted Proxy Set
Each user u selects some of his neighbors as trusted nodes.
The user trusts these nodes both for storing his proﬁle content
and for enforcing access control on the access requests. We
believe leveraging mutual trust relationships for access con-
trol enforcement, in place of encryption-based-access control
simpliﬁes the system to a great extent, especially given that
a typical user in any OSN has millions of data objects but
of very small size. We envision that users mutually cooperate
for hosting content and delegating access control with some
social contracts, even though My3 design does not assume that
trust is mutual between friends. However, the intuition is that
users do not breach the delegation responsibilities because of
social pressure and monitoring. Alternative solutions, which
employ encryption mechanisms for access control and content
storage [8], not only involve complicated key management
issues, but also, are highly inefﬁcient in terms of storage
overhead, as the same data item may need to be encrypted
multiple times for different users with different access rights.
However, trust in a user, may not translate to trust in his
machine/ node. We acknowledge that detecting compromised
nodes is a research problem in itself and assume that any of
the existing mechanisms [9] can be deployed for this purpose.
Let T (u) ⊆ NG(u) be the set of trusted users/nodes for
a user u. T [u] also includes the user u himself in the set of
trusted nodes. The user selects a subset of these trusted users
for hosting his content. We call this set as trusted proxy set
(TPS) (TPS(u) ⊆ T (u)). The content of u is stored on the
members of the set TPS[u] (= TPS(u) ∪ {u}).
Next, we describe several algorithms for the computation of
the set TPS[u]. These algorithms build an online time graph
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Fig. 2: The graph OGu1
for each user and compute the above set from this graph.
Deﬁnition 1: Online time graph: for a user u (denoted by
OGu) is deﬁned as (NG[u], E) where NG[u] is the set of
vertices and E is the set of edges, such that
∀v1, v2 ∈ NG[u], ∃ an edge(v1, v2) ∈ E iff
(v1 ∈ T [u] ∨ v2 ∈ T [u]) ∧ (OTv1 ∩OTv2 = ∅)
Next, we specify the following two conditions on the graph
OGu, which are necessary and sufﬁcient in order to compute
a valid storage conﬁguration.
1) OGu must be connected. Only then, every user in the
set NG[u] can access u’s content.
2) The sub-graph induced by the set T [u] i.e., the graph
OGu[T [u]] must also be connected, in order to al-
low content synchronization across TPS members pass
through only trusted nodes1.
We suppose that each user constructs OGu ofﬂine locally
from online time (OT ) speciﬁcations of his friends. The
construction of OGu is explained with the following example.
Assume a user u1 with neighbors in the OSN u2 to u7 and their
locations set as follows: Lu1 is Switzerland, Lu2 and Lu3 are
India, and ﬁnally the rest are US-West. Assume OT set to 8am
to 5pm local time for all users. Let T [u1] = {u1, u2, u4, u6}.
The resulting OGu1 is shown in Figure 2.
We found that, in the case of real-world datasets (explained
in Section VI, such a graph OGu[T [u]] is connected for a
realistic online time model for more than 95% of the users.
We skip the discussion of handling the modiﬁcations in the
social graph, for brevity reasons.
IV. REPLICATION STRATEGIES
In this section, we describe several algorithms used by My3
for replica selection, which compute TPS optimizing a certain
objective function, as explained below.
A. Maximizing the availability
In this approach, the trusted friends that maximize the
availability of the user proﬁle are chosen as replica locations.
The maximum achievable availability for a user u is limited
by | ∪f∈T [u]OTf |. Hence, the replica selection algorithm
should choose the minimum number of replicas/friends that
jointly achieve this availability. We model this problem as the
conventional set cover problem with the set to be covered (the
universe) chosen as ∪f∈T [u]OTf . Since ﬁnding an optimal
solution for the set cover problem is NP-hard, we solve the
problem with a greedy algorithm as follows: Initially, the node
u is added to the TPS. At each step, a trusted friend that has
1However, as long as the ﬁrst condition is met, nodes from the set T [u] can
be removed one by one until the resulting induced graph becomes connected.
the longest non-overlapping (i.e. uncovered) online time as
compared to the current TPS members is added to the TPS[u]
until no improvement is observed in the achieved availability.
Only the friends that are connected in the online time graph
to any of the current TPS[u] members are considered in each
step. The availability of TPS is the fraction of sum of its
member’s online times over a day (i.e., 24 hours).
B. Minimize the number of replicas (MNR)
The MNR approach minimizes the number of replicas to
be maintained for a user, so as to minimize the storage and
replica management overhead. This approach exploits the fact
that the set TPS can be modeled as the minimum connected
dominating set (MCDS) on the graph OGu, with the additional
constraint that the members of the MCDS must belong to T [u].
Hereby, we modify a greedy algorithm from [10] to solve this
variant of the MCDS problem.
Algorithm 1 The MNR algorithm.
1: Mark all v ∈ OGu as white
2: Mark u as black
3: Mark all neighbors of u in OGu as grey
4: while ∃ a white node in OGu do
5: Select a grey v′ ∈ T (u) such that v′ has the highest
number of white neighbors in OGu
6: Mark v′ as black and its neighbors as grey
7: end while
8: TPS[u] is the set of all black nodes in OGu
C. Minimizing update propagation delay (MPD)
This algorithm minimizes the update propagation delay
among replicas, which is the delay in time between the time
instance, an update occurs on a user proﬁle at one of the
replicas and the instance, the update reaches all the other repli-
cas. We explain the calculation of this delay in the example
of Fig. 3. We assume three replicas of a certain user’s (say
user v) proﬁle residing at nodes v1, v2, and v3 with different
continuous online times represented with begin (ts) and end
(te) times as OTv1 = [t
(v1)
s , t
(v1)
e ], OTv2 = [t
(v2)
s , t
(v2)
e ],
OTv3 = [t
(v3)
s , t
(v3)
e ], for which the replica time connectivity
graph is also shown in the ﬁgure. Let an update event happen at
replica v1 at time t. Then, this update would be communicated
to v2 at time t′, which would take 24− d1 hours, where d1 is
number of overlapping hours between v1 and v2. Furthermore,
since at time t′ node v3 is not online, in order for the update to
reach the replica v3, it would take an additional 24−d2 hours,
where d2 is the gap between t′ and t
(v2)
s in hours. Thus, in
total the update propagation delay between v1 and v3 would
take 48− d1 − d2 hours, which is the worst possible case for
communicating a proﬁle replica update at node v1 to node v3.
Given this, the Update Propagation Delay for a user is
the maximum of propagation delays between all pairs of the
replicas. It is the weight of the longest of the shortest paths
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Fig. 3: Propagation of an update from replica v1 to v3.
among all pairs of replicas in the above graph. Hence, in
above example, the update propagation delay for the user v is
48− d1 − d2 hours. This metric captures the maximum/worst
case update propagation delay for transferring updates among
replicas of a given user proﬁle. This metric directly impacts
the data freshness.
This algorithm minimizes the worst case propagation delay
for the user u. We compute a modiﬁed weighted online time
graph OG′′ from OG by assigning weights to edges between
trusted nodes, equal to the propagation delay between the
corresponding end nodes. Then the problem of the TPS
computation is ﬁnding the MCDS in graph OG′′ such that the
weight of the longest shortest path between any two nodes in
TPS in OG′′ is minimum. The WP (S) function returns the
weight of the longest shortest path in the sub-graph induced
by the set S on OG′′.
Algorithm 2 The MPD algorithm.
1: Mark all v ∈ OG′′u as white
2: Mark u as black
3: add u to TPS
4: Mark all neighbors of u in OG′′u as grey
5: while ∃ a white node in OG′′u do
6: Select a grey v′ ∈ T (u) such that WP (TPS ∪ v′) is
the minimum
7: Mark v′ as black and its neighbors as grey
8: add v′ to TPS
9: end while
D. Minimizing the access cost (MAC)
The MAC approach prioritizes only the access cost for each
friend in a user’s social network. Hence, for every user v
in OGu, it chooses the nearest (i.e., with minimum access
cost) trusted node into the set TPS[u]. This algorithm always
chooses all the trusted nodes into the TPS set. Thus, it uses
all the possible replicas resulting in extensive replication.
E. Maximizing the replication gain
This approach quantiﬁes the replication gain of a given
subset of trusted nodes set (x) and, explores the entire solution
space to pick the right set with the minimum effective cost
as TPS. The storage cost is measured in terms of the total
cost incurred for accessing and updating the proﬁle content by
friends, in addition to that of replica synchronization among
all TPS members.
Replicating a user’s proﬁle increases the availability of
the proﬁle, reduces the average access cost per friend in
accessing the proﬁle. But it induces an overhead in the form
of update propagation delay among replicas. All these three
factors are merged into a weighted objective function with
tunable weights to each of the factors. The algorithm initializes
TPS (i.e. set x) to node u to begin with. Then it adds one
member (i) at a time, from the trusted set which maximizes
the following objective function, until the resulting TPS is a
minimum connected dominating set over the graph OGu.
[
w1 · availability(x ∪ {i})− availability(x)
availability(x)
+w2 ·
∣∣∣ avg({C
x
v })
avg({Cx∪{i}v })− avg({Cxv })
∣∣∣
−w3 · WP (x ∪ {i})−WP (x)
WP (x)
]
where-v ∈ NG(u)
The access cost between a node (v) and a set of nodes (x)
is the access cost between v and its nearest node in x. The
function WP is explained above. This algorithm is referred
to as Hybrid in the evaluation (Section VI).
V. DATA CONSISTENCY
As different replicas of the proﬁle accept update requests
from the friends of the user in an asynchronous way, there
is a need for synchronizing the proﬁles on all replicas. We
propose that after every update, the concerned replica pushes
the update to other TPS members during their online time
frame. Note that OGu[T [u]] is connected. Assume that each
TPS member is informed of other members by the user u
during TPS creation. Until recent updates reach a replica,
it continues to serve access requests with out-dated content,
which is acceptable, as My3 aims for eventual consistency
among replicas with tolerable temporary inconsistencies.
My3 views the content of a proﬁle as a collection of data
objects e.g., a status message, user’s metadata, a photo album,
a photo. A data object (say, a photo album) can be further
decomposed into another collection of objects (resp. photos).
My3 employs vector clocks of size the number of TPS
members in the system. It maintains one vector clock per
object. A vector clock of an object is updated when there
is an update in the object and however, they are not updated
when its constituting objects’ vector clocks are updated. For
example, when a comment is posted on a photo, thus the photo
object is updated, the corresponding vector clock of the photo
is updated and that of the photo album object is kept intact. If
the photo is deleted by the owner user, then the vector clock
of the album object is updated as this deletion is an update on
the album as such.
Updates on a proﬁle are pushed immediately by a replica
to all other replicas. In addition, when a replica comes online,
it announces itself to all other online replicas and pulls any
buffered updates, as explained below.
Each replica buffers a transaction record of an update on
its copy of a user’s proﬁle until a time period (e.g., twice
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the maximum propagation delay for the user). This record
holds all the meta information corresponding to the update
so that other replica, on receiving the record, can replicate the
update exactly. Two replicas when come in contact, exchange
all the records in the buffer and apply the records on the cor-
responding data objects. When concurrent events are detected
on an object (using the vector clocks stored in the records),
the two replicas have to decide on ordering the events. Even
though any ordering of these events results in a valid proﬁle
only (as typical updates on an object will be append-only
updates), we propose the events to be ordered according to the
replica identiﬁers in order to achieve a total order of events
among all the replicas. This results in a consistent view for the
users when they access the proﬁles across replicas. In order to
achieve this, the transaction record should contain the replica
id of the replica which originally received that corresponding
update event as a replica may receive a transaction record from
multiple replicas because of asynchronous update propagation
and nodes’ intermittent online connectivity.
However, this ordering resolution does not take the actual
semantics of the updates into account and hence may lead to
semantically incorrect proﬁle objects occasionally. We expect
the owner of the proﬁle to inspect his proﬁle updates time to
time and ﬁx such semantic incorrectness, though we believe
that such an intervention is needed very rarely. The resulting
ordering of the events must be forced onto other replicas
which should replace corresponding object parts with the one
received from the owner. Thus, the owner replica can be said
to the leader of all other replicas. For brevity, additional details
of the consistency mechanism are skipped.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we illustrate the performance evaluation of
the proposed My3 storage in detail, using real-world datasets
of Facebook and Twitter social networks. First, we present
description of the datasets and then layout the criterion for
evaluating the performance by introducing the metrics, fol-
lowed by analysis of the results.
A. Dataset description
In order to model the essential parameter of My3 algo-
rithms, the online times of users in a social network, we
needed, apart from the social network graph, a dataset with
users’ usual activities on the social network including the
timing of the activities information [11] and their geographical
locations. Two datasets- a Facebook dataset [12] and a Twitter
dataset [13] met our requirements. The user degree distribution
of both the datasets is presented in Fig. 4, which is the number
of friends (resp. followers) in the social network Facebook
(resp. Twitter). The activity considered were the wall posts
(for Facebook dataset), the user’s tweets (for Twitter dataset).
1) Facebook dataset: The Facebook dataset employed is
the NewOrleans Network dataset [12], which has a total of
63,731 users creating a total of 876,994 wall-posts. A wall-
post has a receiver, a creator, and a timestamp.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 50  100  150  200  250
n
u
m
be
r o
f u
se
rs
user degree
Facebook
Twitter
Fig. 4: Distribution of user
degree distribution.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
<10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91-120
121-150
151-180
>180
%
 o
f t
ot
al
 u
se
rs
Online Time Length (in minutes)
Facebook
Twitter
Fig. 5: Distribution of de-
rived user online times.
In a decentralized Facebook realized using the My3 system,
a user’s proﬁle is accessed (by his friends) from any of the
proﬁle replicas which are online at that instant and a wall-
post/update made should be sent to the corresponding replica.
2) Twitter: We employed a simpliﬁed version of the Twitter
dataset of [13], which originally included 158,324 tweets made
by a total of 23,162 users in Twitter between 10-Sep-2009
and 24-Sep-2009. From this dataset, we excluded all the users
whose followers are not present in the dataset. A tweet has
a receiver, a creator, and a timestamp, similar to a wall-post
described before. The dataset contains users from a wide range
of geographical locations.
In a decentralized Twitter over the My3 storage, a user’s
proﬁle can be replicated on his followers. This is a natural
choice as the majority of the information ﬂow in Twitter is
from the user to his followers. When a user is ofﬂine, his
replicas are used by his followers to access his tweets and by
his followees (users followed by him) to communicate their
tweets to him from (i.e., tweets of followees) are communi-
cated to his replicas when he is ofﬂine. Moreover, followers
of the ofﬂine user can access his past tweets from his proﬁle
replicas.
We ﬁltered out users with very little activity (less than 10
wall-posts or tweets) from the above datasets. We ended up
with a total number of 13884 users for Facebook, with the
average degree 41 (i.e. friends) and an average number of 50
activities per user. For Twitter, the ﬁltered dataset contains
14, 933 users with average degree of 76 (i.e. followers).
B. Methodology
We built a Java-based My3 simulator for the evaluation. All
the users in the datasets are modeled inside the simulator and
the activity stream present in the datasets is replayed among
the user objects, separately for Facebook and Twitter. The
proposed performance metrics are quantiﬁed at the end.
However, the My3 algorithms need two important inputs:
one, the online times of users in the network and second, the
trusted friends to be used as replicas for a user’s proﬁle. We
modeled the two inputs as follows:
1) Modeling user online times: In order to approximate
typical users’ online durations, two possibilities exist for the
context of My3, a decentralized social network. One possibility
is to position My3 as an alternative to the conventional social
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networks like Facebook and emulate the online behaviors
of the users on Facebook [6] or Orkut [5] in the My3
system for the evaluation. Alternatively, position the My3
clients as analogous to P2P clients for communication, like
Skype and emulate typical Skype nodes’ session times [14] to
approximate the My3 client’s online times.
In this paper, we model My3 client’s online times as
follows: from the study of user session times in Facebook,
we derive an online time distribution for My3 clients. During
the beginning of the simulation, we choose an online time
for a user from this distribution and the user runs his client
for this amount of time, every time he is active on the social
network. From this online time distribution, we plot percentage
of users in the system that have a particular online time for
both Facebook and Twitter cases, which is shown in Fig. 5.
Once the length of a user’s online times is chosen like above,
the actual online times (time-of-the-day) are computed as
follows: for each activity present in the input activity dataset,
the user is assumed to be online for the above duration with
the activity occurrence positioned at a random instance in this
online window. This is done using the time stamp information
present with each activity in the datasets. For example, assume
that the online time length chosen for a user is 5 minutes. If the
user’s activity is found in the dataset to be done at 8:03am, the
user is said to be active on the social network from 8:00am
to 8:05am if the activity is positioned at 3rd minute of the
session. Likewise, a user is online during the day for a total
time equivalent to number of activities in the dataset times the
length of the online time associated with the user.
For the case of Facebook dataset, My3 clients are online
on average for 42 minutes with a minimum and a maximum
online time of 2 minutes and 194 minutes respectively. Corre-
sponding online times for the Twitter dataset case are: average-
9min, min-2min, and max- 156min. From Fig. 5, one can note
that for the case of Facebook, 80% (and for Twitter, 20%) of
the users are online in a day for a total of less than 10minutes.
2) Selecting trusted friends: We imagine a use case for
My3 where a user manually feeds the set of trusted friends
to the My3 algorithms. However, for the evaluation sake, we
model the trusted friends as the most active friends, friends
who made majority of the activity on a user’s proﬁle: wallposts
in the case of Facebook and tweets in the case of Twitter. We
argue that this is a natural choice as friends with very close
acquaintance usually interact with a user the most, thus enjoy
high degree of trust.
In our evaluation, we choose top-k most active friends as
the trusted friends with k varied from 0 to 10.
3) Modeling access latencies: We model the network laten-
cies between two My3 clients as the network latency between
the corresponding geographic locations of the users as given
in the input datasets. For Facebook dataset, all users are based
in a single location and thus network latency between any two
users is the same and set to 1 in our experiments. For the case
of Twitter, we queried Twitter APIs to retrieve the locations of
the users appearing in the dataset. For actual network latency
statistics, we used Verizon [7] network latency dataset for the
month of April 2012. If a user’s (in Twitter dataset) location is
not found in the latency dataset, we chose a random location
from the dataset as his location. The problem of how latencies
can be approximated between two geo locations is beyond
the scope of the paper and the Verizon dataset is used for
exemplary purpose only. The My3 performance trends, as such,
are in general applicable to any other latency computation
techniques [15].
C. Performance metrics
We enumerate several metrics to evaluate the My3 system
[11].
1) Availability: is the fraction of time in a day, a user’s
proﬁle is reachable through his replicas. For example, if a
user’s proﬁle is available for 12 hours in a day, the availability
is 50%. Note that availability of a user’s proﬁle in My3 is
limited to the union of online times of all of his trusted friends.
2) Availability-on-Demand: measures to what extent a
user’s proﬁle is accessible to only his friends (in contrast to
the availability of a user described above). It is the fraction
of total time, a user’s friends are online (which is size of the
union of their online times), his proﬁle is available through
his replicas. In a privacy-conscious social network, a user’s
proﬁle is typically accessible only to his friends and hence
higher availability-of-demand (even with a lower availability)
is desirable.
3) Propagation Delay: is the delay in time between the
time instance an update occurs on a user proﬁle at one of the
replicas and the instance where the update reaches the last
replica. The calculation of delay for a user is detailed in [11].
4) Access Cost: is the average network latency between
friends of a user and the nearest replica.
5) Load: of a given user is the number of proﬁles stored
on the user as part of whole social network level replication.
A popular and typically most active user in the social network
may end up being the trusted friend for a very high number of
users in the network, thus hosting all of their proﬁles. A good
storage algorithm should balance the load on the replicas in
order to ensure fairness and minimize the maximum load in
the system.
D. Results
We explore two scenarios where a single system-level
choice on replica placement is made and all the users run
same corresponding algorithm. In second case, each user
chooses locally the most preferred replica placement strategy
that meets his criterion. In the Hybrid algorithm case, all the
factors in the object function were given equal weight (i.e.,
w1 = w2 = w3).
1) System level replica placement choices: Here, we
present the observed results ﬁrst, considering all the users
in the system and then, considering users with a particular
number of friends (i.e., degree). We considered a degree of 20
for this case.
As mentioned earlier, the number of trusted friends is varied
from 0 to 10. However, based on the objective of individual
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replica selection algorithms, not all the trusted friends might
be used for replication. The actual number of replicas thus,
chosen is presented in Fig. 6a and 6b for the case of Facebook
and Twitter respectively (the number of replicas counts the
replica on the user client also). The system level averages are
shown. As expected, the MAC algorithm uses the highest
number of replicas. It grows linearly with the number of
trusted friends. Since some users may have a lesser degree than
the input number of trusted friends, the number of replicas is
lesser for MAC case (however, for the case of users with
degree 20 (Fig. 6c and Fig. 6d), we can see that number of
replicas chosen is same as that of number of trusted friends
counting the user himself in addition). All the other algorithms
show a ﬂattened behavior after a point as no improvement in
their objective criterion is observed with increase in number
of replicas. In Fig. 7, the performance of the replica selection
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Fig. 6: Number of replicas chosen: (a),(b): average of all users,
(c),(d): average of users with degree 20.
algorithm w.r.t the metrics described in VI-C. The metrics for
quantiﬁed for each user in the system and average of all users
is plotted in Fig. 7a to Fig. 7c for the Facebook case and
in Fig. 7d to Fig. 7f. It is to be noted that for each point in
the plots, the corresponding values for the metrics the achieved
performance with the corresponding number of replicas shown
in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b. The MAC and MaxAv achieve the
highest availability (Fig. 7a). But MaxAv achieves the same
availability as MAC with much lesser replication degree, for
example at half of the replication for k = 10 as evident
from Fig. 6a. It is impressive to note that an availability of
90% is achieved in spite of a very less total online time of
users, an average of 40 minutes from Fig. 5 for the Facebook
case and mere 9 minutes for Twitter case. Similar availability
performance of the MNR and MPD algorithms can not
be explained alone with the fact that both choose the same
number of replicas as shown in Fig. 6a. Because they exhibit
differently in the case of other metrics. It is due to the chosen
replicas are together online for same time window. However,
the Hybrid algorithm makes a better selection of replicas and
results in better availability with reduced delay (Fig. 7c).
The average availability-on-demand reaches 1 for k = 6.
Given the average degree of 41 for Facebook and 76 for
Twitter, a replication degree of 6 is very promising. Note that
in a privacy-friendly OSN, the proﬁle content should be more
available to friends of a user only and the actual availability
is of secondary importance. The update propagation delay
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Fig. 7: Average of all users.
(denoted as “delay” in the plots) performance is depicted in
Fig. 7c and Fig. 7f. Thanks to the highest number of replicas
chosen, the MAC incurs the worst update propagation delay
among replicas due to incomplete overlap among online time
windows of the replicas. Even though the MPD algorithm
shows up the least delay which is inline with its objective.
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Note that MPD chooses same number of replicas as MNR,
but different ones that minimize the delay. In case of Twitter
also, the MPD shows the best delay performance (Fig. 7f).
The access cost performance for Twitter case is presented in
Fig. 8. Note that for the Facebook case, all the users are from
a single location (NewOrleans) and hence, this study is not
applicable. As the number of replicas grows in MAC, the
average access cost is signiﬁcantly reduced because increased
number of replicas place the content in the close proximity
of many friends. This decreasing trend can be observed with
other algorithms as well. MaxAv stands as the next best
due to higher number of replicas chosen compared to other
algorithms (from Fig. 6a).
Given the system- level averages, the actual distribution of
different values of the metrics is illustrated in Fig. 9 for the
case of availability and load. We chose the case of 10 trusted
friends for these plots. For around 75% users in Facebook, the
availability touches 1 for MaxAv and MAC algorithms. For
the other algorithms, the availability is uniformly distributed.
Regarding the load metric, MAC typically increases the load
on users in the network because of extensive replication. There
are around 0.7% of users in the network hosting more than
100 proﬁles in Facebook case. In case of Twitter too, we can
see that MAC increases the load signiﬁcantly compared to
other algorithms.
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Fig. 8: Twitter average of all users.
In Fig. 10, we consider only the users for a particular degree
of 20 to see the trends in the performance for such users. They
exhibit trends comparable to the system-at-large as shown in
Fig. 7.
2) User level replica placement choices: Since My3 centers
the storage design around a single user, a user in the network
can locally decide the replica selection criterion based on his
objectives. To this end, we studied system level performance in
case of informed personal choices users make in the network.
The distribution of availability (for k = 10) is depicted in
Fig. 11. Other metrics are skipped for brevity. Users choose
one of the listed storage selection algorithms with a uniform
probability. It is interesting to note that users retain their
performance beneﬁts of a particular replication choice, even
individual users in the system choose different algorithms
locally. The trends observed in Fig. 11 match exactly the
ones observed for the case of single system level algorithm
choice in Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b. The total load in the network is
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Fig. 9: Distribution of availability and load.
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Fig. 10: Average of users with degree 20.
observed to be less than 25 per each user which is several times
improvement over system-level choice (for example MAC
which has a maximum load of > 100).
E. Discussion
The MAC and MaxAv improve the availability at cost
of increased replication. An extremely privacy-conscious user
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Fig. 11: Distribution of availability: User- level replica choices.
prefers to have as lesser replication as possible and thus
may choose MNR for replica selection. The availability can
be increased in such case only by increasing the span of
online window of the user himself or his trusted friends.
The Hybrid algorithm should be preferred in general as it
exhibits increased availability over MPD still showing similar
performance for other metrics. In addition, its tunability of
different factors in the objective function offers additional
ﬂexibility in replica selection. The update propagation delay
can be nulliﬁed by suitable 3rd party infrastructure (like a
cloud or DHT) for update propagation. One of ongoing works
to enhance My3 is to build an encryption based updated
propagation infrastructure using storage resources of users
in the social network alone. In the case of highly dynamic
unpredictable user online behaviors, such a storage can be
used to store proﬁle content, in addition to update propagation
among replicas.
VII. RELATED WORK
There is signiﬁcant related work on privacy issues in social
networks. The work in [16] highlights the disparity in the
desired privacy settings on OSNs and the actual settings
provided. It also quantiﬁes the process of managing privacy.
In [17] authors show that conﬁguring privacy settings in the
online social networks is a daunting task. The possibility
for involuntary personal information leakage in current social
networks is highlighted in [18], e.g., by means of certain OSN
features like annotating or tagging user photos, and its effects
are demonstrated in [3].
The Lockr system [19] improves the privacy of centralized
and decentralized content sharing systems. It allows users
to control their own social information by decoupling the
social networking information from other OSN functionality
using social attestations, which act like capabilities. However,
these social attestations are used only for authentication and
authorization is enforced using separate authorization policies.
Persona [20] uses attribute-based encryption to realize privacy-
preserving OSNs. The attributes a user has (e.g., friend, family
member, colleague) determine what data he can access. The
NOYB approach [2] adopts a novel approach for preserving
content privacy. They observe that if users address their privacy
issues themselves by hosting encrypted content on OSNs, they
could be expelled from the OSN by the OSN operator. Hence,
they propose to replace users proﬁle content items with “fake”
items randomly picked from a dictionary. NOYB encrypts the
index of the user’s item in this dictionary and uses the ciphered
index to pick the substitute. On the other hand, ﬂyByNight [21]
encrypts the users’ content that hosts on the OSN.
Recently, the issue of using decentralized infrastructures
for organizing OSNs in a privacy-preserving manner, was ad-
dressed by the research community [22], [8], [23]. In [24], the
authors perform an experimental evaluation of hosting OSN
content from homes as a possible decentralized OSN. PeerSon
[23] adopts encryption mechanisms for content storage and
access control enforcement. It uses a two-tier architecture in
which the ﬁrst tier is a DHT, which is used as a common
storage by all participants. The second tier consists of peers
and contains the user data. The DHT stores the meta-data
required to ﬁnd users. Peers connect each other directly,
exchange the content, and then disconnect. The work in [8]
addresses privacy in OSNs by storing proﬁle content in a
P2P storage infrastructure. Each user in the OSN deﬁnes his
own view (“matryoshka”) of the system. In this view, nodes
are organized in concentric rings, having nodes at each ring
trusted by the nodes in its immediate inner ring, with the
user node being the center of all rings. The user’s proﬁle data
is stored encrypted at the innermost ring, which is accessed
by other users through multi-hop anonymous communication
across this set of concentric rings. In the DHT, an entry for a
user with the list of nodes in the outermost ring is added.
Thus, [8] achieves both content privacy (using encryption)
and anonymity of searcher and hosting nodes, yet limited
content discovery and proﬁle availability, as opposed to our
approach. DECENT [25] proposes a DHT based storage for
OSNs with a special focus on security and privacy using
encryption mechanisms.
A decentralized OSN, Vis-a`-Vis is proposed in [22], where,
a user’s proﬁle content is stored at his own machine called as
virtual individual server (VIS). VISs self-organize into P2P
overlays, one overlay per social group what has access to
content stored on a VIS. Three different storage environments
are considered: cloud alone, P2P storage on top of desktops,
a hybrid storage, and their availability, cost, and privacy
trade-offs were studied. In the desktop-only storage model,
a socially-informed replication scheme was proposed, where
a user replicates his content to his friend nodes and delegates
access control to them. However, normally, a uses trusts only a
fraction of his friends to the extent of delegating access control
enforcement, as considered in our My3 approach along with
online time information. Our earlier work [26] considered trust
based access control delegation in P2P systems.
Tribler [27] is a P2P ﬁle sharing application which exploits
friendship relationships, tastes and preferences of users to
increase the performance of ﬁle sharing. However, in Tribler,
users host their own proﬁle and therefore proﬁle placement
for high availability and low access or consistency cost are
not considered. Finally, LifeSocial [28] is a P2P-hosted OSN
where users employ public-private key pairs to encrypt proﬁle
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data that is stored in a distributed way and is indexed in a
DHT. Friends can read a user’s proﬁle based on a symmetric
key that is encrypted with their public keys. However, data
privacy and proﬁle availability are not considered in [28].
The authors in [29] pursue the notion of online times for a
P2P client in detail. Various replica placement strategies are
studied analytically. The Diaspora [30] project aims to build a
user- owned decentralized online social network. It consists
of independently owned pods (or servers) which host user
proﬁles and form the network. However, the Diaspora system
needs the pods to be online always. We believe that the My3
model for decentralized OSNs where users can run their clients
for a fraction of time compared to always-on availability of
Diaspora, is more amenable.
To the best of our knowledge, My3 is the ﬁrst system
that uniquely identiﬁes the availability of decentralized OSNs
as the critical concern for their adaptability and considers
user behavior characteristics on OSNs and exploit them in
its design.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the design of My3, a privacy-
preserving decentralized OSN. We evaluated its performance
regarding different evaluation criteria using real world data
traces. As experimentally found, high availability is achievable
with a proﬁle replication factor of 4-5. We demonstrate that
the system can meet personalized performance objectives.
Moreover, by employing the hybrid replication algorithm, a
combination of performance objectives can be met and thus
the My3 system could be a viable decentralized alternative to
centralized infrastructures. Our system also involves dealing
with access control policies, identity management and data
integrity; which we leave for future work. Moreover, we plan
to explore system behavior for richer online time models
especially considering the user degrees in the OSNs given that,
a high degree node tends to stay online longer.
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